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ABSTRACT Efforts to reconeeptualize elite strueture and functioning in stable democracies, together with 
data from surveys of elite interaction networks in three demoeratie soeieties, suggest that the eonventional 
power elite, ruling class and pluralist perspeetives are only partly accurate and that fusing them in a more 
realistie model makes mueh sense. Using data from comparable surveys of national elites in the US, Australia 
and West Germany, we argue that the configurations of elite circles in these secieties reveal tight integration, as 
in the power elite and ruling dass models, together with representation of numerous, diverse groups, as in the 
pluralist model. We find comprehensive integration in eaeh of the three national elites, with a tunnel-like 
strueture of communieation networks that is inclusive of all sectors and heterogeneous in the soeial origins, 
attitudes and partyaffiliations of the several hundred most centrally loeated persons. We eontend that an 
informal interaction structure providing all major elite groups aeeess to decisionmaking is a precondition of any 
stable democracy. 
ELITE INTEGRATION IN STABLE 
DEMOCRACIES: A RECONSIDERATION 
Tbe extent and shape of elite integration in 
stable demoeracies are among the most 
persistent and controversial issues in political 
analysis. Research from the pluralist perspective 
typically finds elite fragmentation, with a 
shifting, roughly balanced power structure 
overall (e.g. Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1980). By 
contrast, analyses in the power elite tradition 
(Mills, 1956) find considerable elite integration 
manifested by cohesive nationwide interaction 
networks. Similarly, class analyses taking an 
instrumentalist as opposed to a structuralist 
position (e.g. Miliband, 1969; Whitt, 1982; 
Domhoff, 1983), though disagreeing with the 
power elite perspective on certain aspects of the 
structure and bases of power in capitalist 
societies, generally agree that elites in these 
soeieties are tightly integrated. 
In rethinking issues of elite structure, a 
number of scholars have partly but importantly 
shifted the focus from fragmented balance or 
cohesive hegemony to 'consensual unity' arguing 
that in stable democracies all important elite 
groups participate in decisionmaking and agree 
about informal rules of the game and the worth 
of existing political institutions (Lijphart, 1969; 
Field and Higley, 1973, 1980, 1985; Di Palma, 
1973; Prewitt and Stone, 1973; Putnam, 1976). 
Dovetailing with this general contention, but 
logically separable from the fous on consensual 
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unity, is the claim that several stable 
democracies originated in 'elite settlements' or 
'elite pacts' in which warring elite factions 
compromised their most basic disputes and 
established informal networks that secured each 
other's vital interests, thus laying the basis for 
political stability and an evolution towards 
democracy (O'Donne11 and Schmitter, 1986; 
Burton and Higley, 1987a). Converging with 
both these contentions is Giovanni Sartori's new 
'decision-making theory of democracy', which 
explains how 'a multiplicity of criss-crossing 
power groups engaged in coalitional 
maneuvering' nevertheless perceive decisional 
outcomes as positive-sum and thereby support 
democracy (Sartori, 1987: 147ff). 
These reconceptualizations of elite structure 
and functioning in stable democracies imply that 
elites constitute a 'single national power 
establishment' (Kadushin, 1979) to an extent 
that is not adequately recognized in the ruling 
class, power elite and pluralist perspectives, but 
that is not fundamenta11y incompatible with 
them either: national elites are tightly 
integrated, as in the power elite and dass 
perspectives; at the same time, however, the 
different elite groups represent sufficiently 
heterogeneous interests to provide competition 
among different points of view, as in the 
pluralist perspective. This image of comprehen-
sive elite integration accords with data on the 
interaction patterns of national elites in at least 
three contemporary democracies: the United 
States, Australia, and West Germany. In this 
article, we argue that the configurations of elite 
circles in these democracies reveal the ways in 
which the three familiar perspectives intersect 
and show why they should be fused in a new and 
more realistic model. 
We begin with abrief discussion of elite 
integration and elite circ1es in stable 
democracies. Next, we summarize techniques 
for studying elite circ1es. Then we examine data 
on the circle configurations of American, 
Australian, and West German national elites in 
recent years. Fina11y, we summarize our 
findings, underscore the strengths and 
limitations of our data, and draw conclusions on 
elite integration in stable democracies. 
ELITE INTEGRATION AND ELITE CIRCLES 
Our general contention is that an interaction 
structure which provides a11 important elites 
with access to central decisionmaking arenas is a 
precondition of any stable democracy. Byelites 
we mean persons who hold authoritative 
positions in powerful public and private 
organizations and inftuential movements, and 
who are therefore able to affect strategic 
decisions regularly (see Burton and Higley, 
1987b). If one notes that the pursuit of 
particularistic interests by elites has routinely led 
in history to endemic political instability and to 
numerous autocratic or short-lived democratic 
regimes (Higley and Burton, 1989), it follows 
that elites engage in the non-violent, 
cooperative interactions that are essential for 
stable democracy only when they believe it is to 
their mutual benefit (Higley, Field and Groholt, 
1976: 59-91). This implies that an interaction 
structure which enables all important elites to 
hold and exercise what they regard as more or 
less satisfactory amounts of inftuence on 
decisions of importance to themselves or their 
organizations underlies any stable democratic 
order. 1 In short, it is plausible to think that elites 
in stable democracies engage in power sharing 
and power competition through a complex but 
little understood network structure that is a 
precondition of such democracies. 
As with a11 political theory, ours has ample 
precedent. Pareto (1935) long aga contended 
that the elites of 'pluto-democracies', by which 
he meant the bourgeois and working-c1ass 
leaders who jointly control political 
decisionmaking in industrialized societies, form 
a web in which a11 important centers of inftuence 
and patronage are connected. Though these 
centers are forever quarrelling and competing 
with one another, their integration is 
nevertheless sufficient to warrant thinking of 
them as a single entity: 'It is an order or system 
of a vast number of mutua1ly dependent hubs of 
inlluence and patronage, which keeps together 
by the fact that each such hub is dependent to 
some extent on the good graces of another such 
hub' (Finer, 1966: 67; see also Finer, 1968). 
With his new 'decision-making theory of 
democracy', Giovanni Sartori (1987: 214-53) 
extends and helps concretize this line of 
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reasoning. Sartori theorizes that a stable 
democracy is possible only if the groups that are 
most central to its operation perceive decisional 
outcomes as positive-sum rather than zero-sumo 
'Committee' structures-the numerous, small, 
face-to-face groups of mainly elite actors that 
persist over time-handle continuous fiows of 
decisions and avoid winner-take-all, majority 
rule decisionmaking. As relatively invisible 
entities, committees are the 'real stuft' of 
politics-the places in which issues are 
examined, discussed, drafted, and for the most 
part decided (Sartori, 1987: 228). They function 
according to the principle of 'deferred reciprocal 
compensation' whereby committee members 
who feel less intensely about one issue will go 
along with adecision which they do not 
particularly like because they expect to get their 
way on another issue that is vital to them 
(Sartori, 1987: 229). This inclines members to 
view the totality of committee decisions, few of 
which are ever taken by 'showdown' majority 
votes, as positive-sumo Further, each committee 
exists in a web of other committees, all of which 
interact and coordinate more or less 
spontaneously on the basis of concessions or 
'side payments' that they make to each other. 
Finally, all this is compatible with democracy to 
the extent that popularly-elected or otherwise 
accountable and responsive political leaders 
hold strategic positions in the committee 
structure, representing and registering public 
desires and grievances (Sartori, 1987: 229-35). 
Primarily concerned with the workings of 
explicitly governmental committees, Sartori's 
insightful scheme can be extended to the larger 
interaction structure of national elites tout court. 
By substituting the concept of elite circles for 
committees, we postulate that in stable 
democracies a relatively tight and at the same 
time comprehensive integration of national 
elites permits their members access to 
decisionmaking and fosters a common 
perception of mutual interdependence. 
Thus, national elites can be thought of as 
operating through intricate systems of discrete, 
informal, flexible, but still significantly cohesive 
influence circles that form around and across 
issues and institutions. Though they encompass 
friendships and other personal ties, elite circles 
do not rest primarilyon affect. Rather , they are 
based on repeated interactions among elite 
persons who have common policy interests or 
policy problems to solve. Analytically, these 
circles are the dense parts of much larger 
networks of elite contacts and connections. But 
unlike cliques, committees, and other small 
bodies which are their constituent parts, elite 
circles. and even more so the overall elite 
network, also involve interactions at a distance. 
1nvolving repeated but mainly informal and 
often indirect interactions on common policy 
issues and purposes, elite influence circles 
achieve a significant amount of integration 
without, however, having adesignated or 
permanent set of leaders. One reason is that the 
members of an elite circle usually do not know 
its entire shape and composition. They know the 
members of the circle with whom they regularly 
interact, of course, but they are only dimly 
aware of the circle's wider membership. 
Our theoretical model is not oblivious to 
inter-personal differences in influence. however, 
nor does it imply that elite circ1es are egalitarian 
structures. First, access to central decision-
making arenas is not open to everyone. 1t pre-
supposes that individuals control power 
resources or have a reputation for being an 
expert on the subject matter at hand. Secondly, 
organizational power resources play an 
important role in decisionmaking. Although 
members of decisionmaking committees usually 
try to reach compromises acceptable to 
everyone involved, their perceptions of what 
constitutes a 'fair' compromise depend at least 
partlyon the tacit acceptance of power 
differentials among the different participants. A 
final differentiation derives trom the strategie 
positions of individuals in elite circles. Some of 
their members are more pivotal in the sense that 
they are more closely connected to large 
numbers of other circle members. to other 
important circles, and to other similarly pivotal 
persons. On the other hand, the multi-
dimensional nature of power and influence 
resources in a modern society precludes that the 
various power and influence resources are 
amenable to a simple rank order and is not 
compatible with a one-dimensional concep-
tualilation of power and influence. 
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Given these featmes of elite power and 
inftuence circJes, it is plausible to think that they 
constitute the principal means by which national 
elites broker their diverse and frequently 
opposing individual and organizational interests 
in a modem society. What is at issue, however, 
is not the existence and importance of elite 
circJes per se, but the particular configurations of 
such circJes in stable democracies, for the thrust 
of our argument is that it is primarily through 
the informal, ftexible, and far-ftung interactions 
which circJes permit that elites obtain the mutual 
access to decisionmaking that is a precondition 
of stable democracies. Following Sartori's lead, 
we therefore hypothesize that any stable 
democracy contains multiple elite circJes which 
overlap each other, which cut across societal 
sectors, institutional boundaries, and issue 
arenas, which exist in 'continuous decisional 
contexts', and which, like Sartori's face-to-face 
committees, function according to the 
operational code of do ut des (Kadushin, 1981; 
Sartori, 1987: 228). 
But we go one step further than Sartori 
because we are interested in precisely how the 
multiple elite circles are themselves finally 
integrated to facilitate a stable democracy. Tbe 
answer to this question appears to lie in the 
existence of a large, overarching elite central 
circle which links or meshes most other circles 
and which is the capstone of elite integration in 
stable democracies. Composed of persons who 
belong to more specialized circles and who 
typically are active on several issues or in several 
decisionmaking arenas simultaneously, this 
central circle serves as a clearing house for 
national elite functioning, helping to sift and 
prioritize decisions, and constituting a key 
communications structure for arranging and 
aggregating the trade-offs, compromises, and 
informal understandings without which a large 
and diversified national elite would quickly 
break apart into intransigent and warring 
factions. 
METHODS AND DATA 
In the analysis which folIows, we investigate the 
configurations of elite power and inftuence 
circles in the US, Australia, and West Germany, 
and we show the existence of a large elite central 
cirele in each country. Because these central 
circles are the most novel aspect of our findings, 
and because of their importance for the overall 
extent and shape of elite integration, we 
concentrate on their compositions, internal 
structures, and social characteristics. It is 
necessary to begin, however, with abrief 
discussion of the analytical techniques and data 
we use in this investigation. 
One reason for the inconcJusive nature of the 
debate over elite structure in stable democracies 
is normative: it has hinged on confticting images 
of the 'good society'. But another reason is 
methodological, involving disputes over how 
best to study the structure and functioning of 
national elite or power structures. Systematic 
research is difficult because these structures are 
not readily accessible to observation and the 
content of ties is sometimes seere!. Several 
approaches have been used, each with 
shortcomings. One is to study elite structures by 
looking at outcomes, asking who prevails on 
important decisions (e.g. Dahl, 1961) or who has 
the most money or other scarce resources (e.g. 
Domhoff, 1983). But the analysis of outcomes 
has been criticized for focusing only on issues 
involving overt conflict and on the final stage of 
decision processes (e.g. Bachrach and Baratz, 
1963; Lukes, 1974). Likewise, studying the 
possession of valued resources focuses 
exclusively on readily measurable resources such 
as capital. 
A second approach, common in the past two 
decades, analyzes overlapping corporate 
directorships (e.g. Allen, 1974; Mizruchi, 1982; 
Useem, 1984; Mintz and Schwartz, 1985; 
Stokman, ZiegJer and Scot!, 1985). Tbis 
research yields intriguing maps of ties between 
corporate boards of directors but is incomplete 
as an analysis of power both because it focuses 
only on economic institutlons and because the 
content of ties as well as their impact are usually 
unknown. 
A third approach examines issue-based 
organizational networks within policy domains 
as a way of understanding structures of power 
(Laumann and Knoke, 1987). Tbis overcomes 
some of the problems in corporate overlap 
studies because it relates organizational network 
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structures to both issue preferences and 
decisional outcomes. The foeus on specific 
issues, however, limits its usefulness for gaining 
a general picture of politics at the top in the 
same way that the decisionmaking studies of 
how certain laws or regulations came to be 
passed have historical but not necessarily 
general validity. An accumulation of issue-based 
studies may hold out the greatest promise for an 
understanding of elite structures, but this 
promise may yet be dashed on the rocks of elite 
secrecy and considerations about legitimate 
research techniques noted above. In any case, 
we do not now have this aceumulation. 
A fourth approach to studying power 
structures attempts agiobai mapping of 
generalized relations between elites. This avoids 
some of the problems of other approaches since 
it is not restricted to one sector or policy 
domain. Like corporate overlap studies, agiobai 
mapping lacks information on the content of 
ties. But by providing a 'bird's-eye view' of elite 
structure as manifested in the interaction 
patterns among numerous powerful groups 
dealing with scores of policy issues and many 
issue domains, it allows assessment of degrees of 
integration or fragmentation overall. For this 
reason and because it is consistent with our 
circIe model of elite structure, we have adopted 
the global mapping approach in our research. 
Our data are taken from comparable surveys 
of national elites in the United States in 
1971-72, Australia in 1975, and West Germany 
in 1981. Designed to study elites in institutional 
sectors with broad impact on national policy-
making and political processes, each survey 
involved interviews with several hundred 
occupants of key decisionmaking positions in 
major public and private sectors. Consistent 
with our theoretical orientation, the interviews 
gathered data on policy activities, attitudes, 
involvement in elite communication networks, 
and social backgrounds. There were 545 
respondents in the American survey, 370 in the 
Australian, and 497 in the West German. 2 
Sampie design began with the identification of 
key organizations in national policy-making. 
The top position-holders in each institutional 
sector were sampled: politics, civil service, 
business, trade unions, mass media, voluntary 
associations, and the academie sphere. The 
organizations and positions identified were 
similar, but not identical, in the three surveys. 
For example, in politics leading members of 
ParliamentlCongress, top party officials, cabinet 
ministerslsecretaries, and other key federal and 
state leaders were sampled. Likewise, in 
business the chief executive officers and board 
chairmen of the largest industrial and non-
industrial corporations and financial institutions 
were in each sampie. The sectors, organizations, 
and positions are described more fully in 
Appendix A. It is important to note that in each 
survey the positional sam pie was supplemented 
by a snowball sampie in which persons who were 
not in the original sampIe were interviewed if 
they were mentioned as key actors by three or 
more respondents.3 
Eaeh respondent was asked to name the one 
national issue on which he or she had most 
actively attempted to influence national policy 
or public opinion during the preeeding twelve 
months. A wide variety of issues was named in 
each country. Respondents were questioned 
extensively about their assessments of and 
activities on the issue they named. Included 
were aseries of sociometric questions asking the 
names of the persons with whom they interacted 
over this issue. Each interaction generated by 
these questions ean be seen as a policy-related 
eommunication link. 
Our network data thus consists of contacts 
between respondents and the persons they 
named in answer to the sociometric questions. 
Because selective memory tends to reveal the 
'deep structure' of social networks by blanking 
out less relevant partners while recalling the 
more important ones (Freeman, Romney and 
Freeman, 1987), it is reasonable to assume that 
our data are not merely an ephemeral collection 
of names. But it is important to understand the 
Iimitations of our procedure. These data are an 
attempt to develop the traces of any system of 
circIes and 'eommittees' that might exist. Yet the 
particular contacts reported must not be reified. 
First, the contacts reported by respondents were 
hardly the only eontacts among elites in the 
three societies at the time of the surveys because 
respondents were Iimited to reporting their 
interaction partners on only one issue, even 
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though they presumably were active on several 
issues simuItaneously. Thus our data grossly 
underestimate the actual density of policy-
related contacts among elites in the three 
socielies. Should these data reveal an integrated 
interaction structure, one can safely assurne not 
only that such a structure existed, but that it was 
actually much more dense than our data 
indicate. Second, the contacts that are reported 
are those the respondent feit to be in pursuit of 
legitimate attempts to inlluence policy. Elite 
studies conducted by social scientists can never 
hope to uncover the truly ilIegitimate.4 Tbird, 
our data are not sufficientiy detailed or accurate 
to distinguish who initiated a contact. For this 
and another reasen to be explained shortly, we 
must assume that if A talked to B, B talked to A 
and thus the networks we analyze are non-
directional. 5 
Dur analytic procedures are intended not to 
test the Iikelihood of a particular connection 
existing or not existing, nor to gain an estimate 
of the true density of interaction but rather , 
consistent with our theory, to recover the overall 
patterning of interactions. Tbe aim is to test the 
likelihood that (l) there are various circIes and 
'committees' and (2) to gain some estimate of 
the degree to which they overlap. 
Network theory customarily distinguishes two 
models for analyzing data on interaction 
patterns: the model of social cohesion and the 
model of structural equivalence (Burt, 1987; 
Laumann and Knoke, 1987). Tbe former 
searches within a large network for denser parts 
or areas that are characterized by high cohesion. 
The latter identifies sets of persons with similar 
patterns of connections to others. Since we are 
interested in the extent of integration of national 
elite communication networks, the cohesion 
model is clearly more appropriate for our 
analysis. It offers two strategies for determining 
the relative locations of individuals in a network: 
(1) identifying those who make up the more 
cohesive parts of the network, and (2) 
measuring the relative centrality of each 
network member. In the analysis which folIows, 
we employ both strategies to examine the 
American, Australian, and West German 
national elite networks. 
RESULTS 
The Central Cire/es 
A procedure developed by Alba (1972, 1973; 
Alba and Guttmann, 1972) identifies the more 
cohesive parts of networks. Cliques consisting of 
three or more persons all of whom interact on a 
face-to-face basis are the basic building blocks. 
But because a national elite in a large and 
complex society cannot possibly be connected 
through face-to-face interactions alone, indirect 
contacts through intermediaries must also be 
studied, provided that they involve only one or a 
few intermediaries. Studying such indirect 
contacts is consistent with Granovetter's weIl-
known thesis about the 'strength of weak lies' 
(1973). A key question is the extent to which 
direct and indirect contacts combine to form 
elite circ1es (Kadushin, 1968, 1979). 
Concretely, our analysis begins with the 
matrix of links formed by all contacts reported 
by respondents. Tbis matrix includes 
respondents as weil as non-respondents who 
were named by two or more respondents and 
thus constitute a link between those who named 
them. The indusion of non-respondents is 
crucial for two reasons. First, it is not possible to 
interview all the persons in a national elite, so 
that the matrix of contact partners is necessarily 
incomplete. But second and more importantly, 
the uni verse of persons actively trying to 
inftuence national policies almost certainly 
differs from the universe of positionaIly-defined 
elites. The former universe is unknown to the 
researcher at the beginning of a study because it 
may include inftuential persons who no langer 
hold formal elite positions at the time of the 
. study (e.g. 'eider statesmen') as weil as persons 
who are important even though they have not 
yet reached elite positions ('high ftiers'), plus' 
others whose inftuence primarily rests on 
personal attributes rather than the formal power 
resources associated with positions in important 
organizations. By inc1uding non-respondents in 
the matrix, and by interviewing persons not in 
the original sampie who are frequently named 
by sampie members (i.e. snowball sampling), 
these problems in elite research are at least 
partly overcome. Tbis indusion of persons 
named but not interviewed is an additional 
reason for not assuming directionality in 
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reported interactions, since the persons not 
interviewed cannot report on their view of who 
initiated the interaction. In sum, the first step in 
our analysis involves reducing the matrix of all 
reported contacts to a network of persons, all of 
whom are interconnected direclly or through 
intermediaries. 
This procedure identified connected networks 
of roughly 800 persons in each of the national 
elites studied: 876 in the US, 746 in Australia, 
and 799 in West Germany. The density of each 
network is similar and relatively low: the 
interpersonal ties respondents reported amount 
to about 1 per cent of all possible ties among 
network members. However, each of the 
networks contains a sizable number of cohesive 
cliques and circles: 32 in the American network, 
22 in West Germany, and 11 in Australia. In 
each country, the majority of these cliques and 
circles are smalI, seldom numbering more than a 
handful of persons. But in each national elite 
network there is also a large, relatively inclusive 
circle composed of several hundred persons. 
This 'central circle' contains 227 persons in the 
US, 340 in West Germany, and 418 in Australia. 
The density of each circle is roughly three limes 
that of the national elite network: 3·8 per cent in 
the US, 2·6 per cent in Australia, and 2·7 per 
cent in West Germany. Thus central circle 
members can contact each other more readily 
than the typical member of the larger network 
can contact other network members. 
Neework Centraliey 
Centrality is another widely used network 
analytic procedure with an emphasis different 
from that of clique and circle detection. It 
TAstE 1 Characleristics ofthe American (USA). Australion 
(AUS) and West German (FRG) elite ne/wor/es 
Sampie members (n) 
Network members (0) 
Network density (%) 
Cliques (n) 
Circles(n) 
Central circle members (0) 
Central circle density (%) 
USA 
545 
876 
0·7 
442 
32 
227 
3-8 
AUS 
370 
746 
1·1 
1132 
11 
418 
2-6 
FRG 
497 
799 
0·9 
739 
22 
340 
2·7 
denotes, in essence. the number of 
communication paths which pass through an 
individual's network location (Freeman, 1977). 
Thus a highly central individual need not be a 
member of cohesive cliques and circles since a 
high centrality score can be achieved through 
connections to persons who are not themselves 
connected. Many measures of network 
centrality have been developed (e.g. Freeman, 
1977: Knoke and Burt, 1983; Bonacich, 1987), 
though they are all highly intercorrelated 
(Bolland, 1988). A 'reachability' measure based 
on the number of persons each network member 
could re ach within two steps (i.e. through one 
intermediary) was calculated for each network 
member. Persons highly central by this measure 
could therefore easily communicate with a large 
number of other elites. Less central persons 
would have to spend more time and effort to 
reach many others. 
This centrality measure allows us to study the 
core of each national elite by focusing on the 100 
individuals who could reach the largest numbers 
of others either direclly or through single 
intermediaries. It is worth noting that the most 
central American could reach 389 other persons 
in the elite network in this way, his Australian 
counterpart could reach 462 others, and the 
most central West German could reach 436 
others. By contrast, the least central person in 
each national elite network could reach only half 
a dozen others directly or through single 
intermediaries. While these centrality scores are 
calculated for the full networks and are 
determined by a method different from that by 
which the central circles are identified. virtually 
all of the 100 most central persons in each 
network are also members of the central circle. 
To this extent, these 100 most central persons 
can be thought of as forming the core of each 
central circle. 6 
Composition of ehe Central Cireles and Circ/e 
Cores 
Consistent with the thesis of relatively 
comprehensive integration of national elites in 
stable democracies, representatives of all 
important institutional sectors belong to the elite 
networks and central circ1es in each country. 
Table 2 shows the sector composition of the 
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TABLE 2 Seelor composition 0/ the sampie, network, central circle and eore in (he American (USA), Auslralian and West 
German (FRG) elite studies (%) 
USA Australia FRG 
Sector Sampie Network Cirele Core Sampie Network Circle Core Sampie Network Cirele eoce 
Politics 33·0 52-1 50·2 71·0 21-6 
Civil Service 9·9 8·2 5·7 1·0 13-5 
Business 24·2 13·5 16·3 9·0 24·3 
Labor Unions 8·8 6·1 7·0 4·0 13·5 
Media 11·6 8·1 7·5 2·0 10·8 
Vol. Assoc. 9·5 6·5 4-4 6·0 10·8 
Academic 2·9 4·0 7·5 7·0 5-4 
Other 0·0 1·5 1·3 0·0 0·0 
(n) (545) (876) (227) (100) (370) 
original elite sampie, the network, the central 
circle, and the circle core in each country. We 
interpret the presence of representatives from 
all sectors in the central circles and their cores as 
evidence of relatively comprehensive elite 
integration. 
All sectors, however, are not equally 
represented in the central circles. The 
prevalence of political leaders and government 
officials in the central circ1es is a striking 
similarity in the three national elites. Roughly 
half of each central circle consists of political and 
civil service elites. While this pattern is most 
pronounced in the US, it is c1ear in Australia 
and West Germany as weil.' 
Lacking direct data on the inftuence of 
different sectors in the central circles, we use as 
a rough estimate of sectoral over- and under-
representation a comparison of a sector's 
proportions in the original sampie and in the 
central circle. On the assumption that sampie 
members, in contrast to non-respondents, had 
equal opportunities to name others, and thus to 
be members of the central circle, a sector is 
over-represented if its members are more 
numerous in the circle than in the sampie. As 
already noted, politicians are over-represented 
in all three central circles, while civil servants 
are over-represented only in· Australia. 
Conversely, business elites are numerically 
under-represented in all three central circles, 
while trade union leaders are over-represented 
only in the German circ1e.8 Media elites are 
under-represented in all three circles, which is 
consistent with the claims of some media 
28·3 27·2 25·0 27-8 34·2 37·6 38·0 
17·7 18·4 19·0 11·9 1204 9·4 5·0 
17·3 20·8 37·0 29·2 23·9 25·0 27·0 
8·9 8·9 4·0 4-6 6·9 9·7 10·0 
8·1 8·1 6·0 12·1 10·0 10·0 14·0 
6·9 4·8 5·0 2·8 2·4 1·8 2·0 
10·3 9·8 4·0 6·8 6·5 5·6 4·0 
2·5 1·9 0·0 4·8 3-8 0·9 0·0 
(746) (418) (100) (497) (799) (340) (100) 
respondents that they are observers of, not 
active participants in, policy-making. Similarly, 
leaders of voluntary associations are weakly 
represented in all three central circles. By 
contrast, academics play a more important role. 
Conspicuous by their absence in the central 
circ1es are military and cultural elites (e.g. 
religious leaders, intellectuals, artists, 
entertainment celebrities). Some of these elites 
were not in the positional sampies, and to that 
extent they had a lower probability of entering 
the central circles. But this is only part of the 
explanation for their absence. First, the 
snowball sampling procedure brings in 
important elites who were not part of the 
positional sampie. Secondly, the openness of the 
network analytic procedure allows for the 
inc1usion of non-respondents, and, indeed, quite 
a few non-respondents ended up in the central 
circles: 63 in the American, 143 in the 
Australian, and 110 in the West German. 
Consequently, well-connected members of the 
military and cultural elites could have found 
places in the central circles even though they 
were not interviewed. In any event, military 
leaders were included in the West German 
sampie, and top-ranking religious leaders were 
included in both the West German and 
Australian sampies. But even then, no West 
German military commander belonged to the 
central circle, and neither did any religious 
leader in West Germany or Australia. As 
regards intellectuals, artists, and entertainment 
figures, a study of the American intellectual elite 
in the early 1970s found few connections 
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between its members and other elites 
(Kadushin, 1974), while a study of the Yugoslav 
national elite, which included academic and 
cultural elites as one of its sampled sectors, also 
showed few connections between them and the 
other elites (Barton, Denitch and Kadushin; 
1973). 
Table 2 also shows the sector composition of 
the central circie core in each country-the 100 
persons who could reach the largest numbers of 
other persons either directly or through single 
intermediaries. As is true for the central circies, 
the circie cores contain representatives from all 
elite sectors. In the US, political·governmental 
leaders comprise nearly three·quarters of the 
cirele core, suggesting their utter centrality in 
the national elite. In Australia and West 
Germany, political·governmental leaders also 
dominate the cores, though not to the same 
exten!. In Australia, the business elite is strongly 
over·represented in the core which suggests that 
political·governmental and business leaders 
form a tightly interconnected and somewhat 
exciusive 'power elite' formation in that country. 
However, in contrast to assumptions of power 
elite theorists, the political·governmental 
leaders in this formation are associated in more 
or less equal numbers with parties sympathetic 
to and those somewhat hostile towards business 
interests. In West Germany, the cirele core is 
more diverse. Political·governmental leaders 
comprise 43 per cent of the core, but in contrast 
to Australia, business leaders are somewhat 
under·represented, while trade union and media 
leaders are somewhat over·represented, with 
other elites showing up in proportions that 
parallel their memberships in the central drele. 
Social and Positional Correlates 01 Circle and 
Core Membership 
Numerous studies have found that occupants of 
national elite positions are distinguished by their 
privileged social origins, higher education, and 
greater age (see Putnam, 1976 for a summary of 
this research). Dur data are consistent with 
these lindings: In the US, West Germany, and 
Australia, only a small proportion of elites have 
working·elass origins, the bulk of them have 
university educations, and their average age is in 
the early lifties (Higley, Deacon and Smart, 
1979; Moore, 1979; Hoffmann·Lange, 1985). As 
one would expect, the major exception to these 
general patterns is the trade union elites: they 
much more often come from working·elass 
backgrounds and less often hold university 
degrees. 
Putting the trade union elites to one side, do 
elite persons with privileged backgrounds more 
frequently end up in the most central network 
locations as has been found for business elites in 
the 'inner drcie' (Useem, 1984: 66-70)? It 
appears that they do not. Table 3 shows that 
social elass origins,9 measured by whether a 
respondent's father was a member of the 
working elass, play little, if any, role in 
determining where a person is situated in the 
national elite network. In West Germany and 
Australia there is the hint of a slight 
disadvantage for politicalleaders from working· 
elass backgrounds in reaching the central cirele 
cores (even though both countries had left·of· 
center, trade union·linked governments at the 
time of the surveys), but overall, the three 
networks do not appear to be structured 
internally in any strong way by the dass origins 
of their members. These resuits suggest that 
while upper·class origins remain advantageous 
for achieving membership in the elite (Putnam, 
1976: 21-44), their importance fades once 
membership has been achieved. 
Far more important for the locations of indi· 
viduals in the elite circies and cores are their 
formal organizational positions as weIl as their 
policy·making activities and visibility associated 
with these formal positions. In all three 
countries, centrality in the elite network results 
to a large extent from holding the most senior 
positions in important institutions and 
TABLE 3 Father working dass for sampie, centraf circle and 
core according 10 seclar type Jor American (USA), AustraJian 
(AUS) and West German (FRG) elites (%) 
Politieal sectors Other sectors 
USA AUS FRG USA AUS FRG 
Sampie 9·4 25·8 30·9 18·8 11·6 20·5 
Central 
circle 11·4 27·1 24·6 16·7 11·5 25·7 Co,. 15·2 12·9 11-1 13·0 12-9 28·3 
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organizations. For example, in Australia three-
quarters of an federal cabinet ministers belong 
to the central circle, while only 18 per cent of 
their back-bench colleagues in federal 
Parliament are in the circ1e. In West Germany 
an core members hold senior organizational 
positions; these include, for example, 7 of the 17 
members of the federal cabinet and 7 of the 11 
state prime ministers. 
Similarly, an analysis of public1y visible 
policy-making activities, such as testifying 
before parliamentary or congressional com-
mittees, participating on govemment advisory 
committees, giving issue-related speeches, 
writing articles advocating pOlicies, and the like, 
shows that central circ1e members in an three 
countries are much more heavily involved in 
such activities than are those outside the central 
circ1es (Moore, 1979; Higley and Moore, 1981). 
Political Correlates of Central Circle and Core 
Membership 
Evidence presented so far shows that elite 
central circles and their cores are inc1usive in 
terms of sector composition and composed 
primarily of the most senior and active formal 
position-holders. We now ask whether central 
circles and cores are similarly inc1usive in terms 
of explicitly political affiliations and attitudes. 
Table 4 shows the political party preferences of 
American, Australian, and West German re-
spondents according to their network and sector 
T ABLE 4 Party preference for sampie, centra/ eirele and eore 
Qccording 10 StelOT rype for American (USA), Australian and 
West German (FRG) elites (%) 
SampI. Circle Cor. 
USA: % Republican 
Politieal seetors 5l-4 49·3 55·3 
Other seetors 40·5 34·1 34·8 
Australia: % Labor 
Political seetors 37·7 42-1 58·3 
Other sectors 13·3 13·0 7·1 
FRG: % SPDIFDP 
Political seelors 63·8 70·3 76·2 
Other seetors 37·9 37·8 33·2 
locations. The proportions of respondents 
preferring the party in power at the time of each 
survey are given: in the US, the Republican 
Party is listed because it controlled the executive 
branch of government, even though Congress 
was controlled by the Democrats in 1971-72; in 
Australia the Labor Party is listed because it 
contro11ed the federal government during most 
of 1975; and in West Germany the Social 
Democrat-Free Democrat coalition is listed 
because it controlled a majority of votes in 
federal parJiament in 1981. 
Despite the Republican Party's ascendancy in 
the US, membership in that party was no more 
common for politicians in the sam pie than for 
those in the central circle core, and it was a little 
less common among core members from other 
sectors than for persons outside the core in those 
sectors. In Australia, Labor Party politicians 
were more numerous in the circ1e core than in 
the original sampie, but outside of the political 
elite Labor Party affiliation was not correlated 
with centrality. Similarly, in West Germany 
politicians affiliated with the SPDIFDP govern-
ing coalition comprised a targer proportion of 
the circle core than they they did of the original 
sampie, though, as in Australia, affiliation with 
the dominant party or parties was not correlated 
with centrality elsewhere in the elite network. 
These patterns suggest that the formal system of 
government does affect elite networks, a point 
we will return to later. 
What about issue attitudes? Do these corre-
late with centrality? Because they generate 
sharp c1eavages between different components 
of the national elite, controversial issues might 
be expected to divide the elite into distinct, 
informal camps of like-minded persons, with 
one camp being clearly more central in the 
network. To illustrate, one of the most con-
troversial issue items in the American elite 
opinion survey was the statement that 'We 
should have more effective taxation of 
inheritance to minimize the passing on of large 
family fortunes'. Seventy-nine per cent of 
business leaders opposed this statement, but it 
was supported by 93 per cent of trade union 
leaders (Barton, 1985: 192-4). In a11 three 
surveys, similarly large cleavages existed 
between different elite sectors on several issue 
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items (for Australia, see Higley, Deacon and 
Smart, 1979: 120-45; for West Germany, see 
Hoffmann-Lange, 1986: 125-30). 
Elites with sharply opposing views 
nevertheless interact extensively with each other 
in the countries we are considering. Analysis of 
highly controversial issues shows that the 
diversity of issue attitudes is as great in the 
central cireles and cirele cores as it is in the 
larger elite sam pies. In short, within each 
network segment, diversity rather than hom-
ogeneity of opinions seems to be the rule. 
Additional support for this observation comes 
from analyses of issue c1eavages among our 
American respondents done by Barton (1985) 
and Parsons (1976). On seven attitude scales, 
Barton (1985: 206) finds that central circ1e 
members' scores differ only slightly from the 
mean scores of the sampie as a whole, leading 
hirn to conc\ude that attitude homogeneity is not 
a feature of the eentral eirele. Parsons finds that 
central cirele members are more willing to 
compromise on poliey questions than are elite 
persons who are not in the eentral eircle (1976: 
302-{j).lO Thus, agreement on poliey attitudes is 
not more common among members of the cen-
tral cirele or the cirele core than among elites as 
a whole, though openness to eompromise may 
be a charaeteristic that somewhat distinguishes 
circle members from their less eentrally loeated 
eolleagues. 
OISCUSSION 
Proponents of the power elite, ruling elass and 
pluralist perspeetives on elite integration in 
stable democracies have frequently couehed 
their analyses in terms of elite circ\es. For C. 
Wright Mills, the American power elite of the 
1950s consisted of 'those politieal, eeonomic, 
and military circles which as an intricate set of 
overiapping eliques share decisions having . . . 
national eonsequences' (Mills, 1956: 18). But 
while Mills portrayed the power elite in cirele 
terms, he was vague about its configurations, 
merely alluding to an unspecified number of 
military, eeonomie and 'public deeision-making' 
cireles whose members have eommon social 
origins, career patterns, life styles, and thus 
personality and other psyehological affinities 
(pp. 278-83). Regarding the overall integration 
of the elite, Mills claimed that some small 
number of persons who belong to two or more of 
these 'higher cireles' integrate them and 
eonstitute the power elite's 'inner core' (pp. 
288-9). Meanwhile, pluralists have contended 
that elites in democracies are arrayed in 'a 
eluster of interlocking circles, each one 
preoccupied with its own professionalism and 
expertise and touching others only at one edge' 
(Bottomore, 1964: 34). Though they do not 
speeify the number, size, or compositions of 
these elite circles, pluralists believe that they are 
basically autonomous, have no central 
eoordinating body other than the government 
itself, and exist in a kind of natural, enduring 
balance. 
Our findings about the strueture of American, 
Australian, and West German national elite 
networks and the central cireles they contain 
depict a more comprehensive integration of 
elites than the familiar perspectives separately 
envisage. On the basis of survey data covering 
all important elite sectors and major national 
poliey issues that were being aetively considered 
at the times of our research, we find a funnel-
Iike structure of elite eommunieation and 
discussion about policy issues which is inclusive 
of all elite sectors and heterogeneous in the 
social origins, issue attitudes, and party 
affiliations of the several hundred persons most 
centrally located in it. The key feature of this 
structure in each country is a large, diverse, but 
significantly integrated central cirele which itself 
narrows into a core of tightly interconneeted 
individuals, each of whom is in elose contact 
with several hundred other elite persons in the 
central cirele and beyond it. The extent of elite 
integration which this funnel-like structure 
represents accords with what the power elite and 
some versions of the ruling elass perspective lead 
one to expect; but the composition of the 
structure is more in line with pluralist claims 
about elite inclusiveness and heterogeneity in 
stable democracies. 
It is important to be dear about what these 
data do and do not show. The first issue is 
whether the elite circles are a methodological 
artifact ratber than a substantive result. One 
might argue that since our positional sampies 
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were supplemented by snowball sampies and 
included individuals because of their links to 
others in the network, the connectedness of the 
network is a trivial result of our sampling 
procedure. However, only a few respondents 
belonged to the snowball sampies and their 
numbers are not sufficient to explain the overall 
connectedness of the elite networks. Further , 
imagine two counter-examples: If respondents 
from each sector named non-sample members 
only from their own sector, the result would be 
circles organized by sector. Similarly, if elites 
were involved in a single issue area and 
respondents named only a few fellow activists on 
that issue, the result would . be a structure 
fragmented overall. 
One could ask to what extent the resulting 
structure was predetermined by the choice of the 
overlap criterion utilized for merging cliques and 
circIes, with merging when two-thirds of one 
group also belong to another. A more de-
manding criterion would have resulted in a more 
fragmented structure, while a more lenient 
criterion would have produced a more inclusive 
structure. OUT overlap criterion avoids both of 
these extremes. It allows indirect links to be 
seen as important means of structural inte-
gration, while also requiring considerable 
overlap, to guarantee that integration is not 
based on single individuals connecting otherwise 
disparate cliques or circles. Therefore, we can 
safely conelude that the central circles found are 
not methodological artifacts. 
An equally important question is the basis of 
access to the elite networks. Inlluence on 
nationaUy important decisions is most often 
based on the power resources associated with 
elite positions, but mayaiso rest on the personal 
qualities of individuals. While the large numbers 
of holders of senior elite positions among circle 
members indicate the importance of formal 
power resources for the resolution of nationally-
important issues, the inclusion of other persons 
lacking those resources shows that personal 
attributes such as knowledge and social skills are 
also important. It is also true, however, that the 
positionally-defined elite sampie that constituted 
the original basis for the nomination of 
interaction partners enhances the chances of 
holders of senior elite positions becoming 
members of the elite networks and central 
circles. Still, the inclusion of snowball 
respondents as weil as non-respondents who 
were not holders of such positions at the time of 
the surveys shows that influence on national 
issues is by no means limited to individuals who 
control important organizational power 
resources. And vice versa, only a small number 
of all holders of elite positions showed up in the 
elite central circles. 
Our data are limited in several respects. We 
have already noted that the data grossly 
underestimate the actual density of the elite 
networks studied. The incompleteness of the 
network matrices also means that one must not 
reify memberships of specific individuals in the 
networks or central circles. Instead, we 
concentrate on their overall compositions and 
structures. Although the several hundred 
individuals who make up each central circle 
were clearly important, nationally-known 
figures at the times of our studies, other 
prominent persons were not included. More-
over, because issues and elite position-holders 
are eontinually changing, it is dear that the 
structure we have analyzed must be regarded as 
fluid. Nevertheless, since the number of large 
and powerful organizations whose top position-
holders are necessarily in the thick of national 
elite interactions is relatively small and invariant 
in the short ron, the rough proportions of 
different elite sectors in networks and circles are 
probably fairly stable. 
Our data are also not appropriate for studying 
issue-spedfic networks. Pappi has argued. that 
'the merging of links, irrespective of discussion 
topics, into one large network wipes away all 
issue-specific contours and identifies a core 
region of persons active in several issue areas'. 
He adds. however, that this is not necessarily a 
disadvantage, 'because mediating between dif-
ferent issue publics is one of the principal 
functions of the integrative core of an elite 
system' (1984: 85). 
Similarly, we have no information on the 
eontent of the relations on which the network 
analyses were based. Since decisionmaking 
routinely involves c1ashes between opposing 
interests, it is realistic to assume that the 
respondents named not only interaction partners 
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with whom they agreed, but also their adver-
saries. Since our study deals primarily with elite 
integration, however, the content of links is of 
secondary importance since friendly as weil as 
conftictual relations contribute to elite inte-
gration, so long as conflicts are multifaceted and 
do not regularly involve the same parties. 
The relational network model generally 
neglects differences of power other than those 
associated with network positions. Therefore, 
our model of democratic elites is based on the 
assumption that, due to their ftuid and inter-
stitial nature, elite cirdes are relatively 
egalitarian structures. We consider access to 
decisionmaking arenas as the single most 
important resource in decisionmaking. While it 
is often true that the control of power resources 
is a precondition of such access, we contend that 
no simple hierarchy of power exists among the 
members of elite cirdes. Class theorists have 
instead often assumed that economic resources 
are ultimately decisive and invariably determine 
the outcomes of decisions. 
Finally, the approach also neglects policy 
outcomes. Whether the outcomes produced by 
these structures are skewed in favor of one elite 
sector or faction, or whether they approximate a 
rough equilibrium among elites, are questions 
we cannot answer with these data. Patterns in 
the results can be interpreted as pointing in both 
directions. For example, the large number and 
generally central locations of key business 
leaders in eaeh country's central cirde and core 
suggest that business elites are positioned to get 
their way on economie and other salient issues 
more often than not, as would be expected by 
dass theorists. On the other hand, the fact that 
political and governmental elites are even more 
numerous and pivotally located in each 
country's eentral eircle and core, and the fact 
that this results from their dose ties to all elite 
sectors, not just to business, implies that the 
power and inftuence of business elites are much 
less than hegemonie. In our view, crucial is a 
shared expectation that the system guarantees a 
fair chance to all participants to assert their 
interests, i.e. a belief in its distributive justice. 
This is compatible with an imbalanced distri-
bution of benefits, but not with the exdusion of 
important organizations from decisionmaking. 
We were able to demonstrate the existence of 
inclusive elite central cirdes in the countries 
studied. However, one might argue that while 
an inclusive elite structure indicates political 
stability, it is not necessarily compatible with 
democracy since a smalI, socially exdusive and 
attitudinaUy homogeneous power elite might 
still dominate the entire range of important 
organizations. How do we support the claim that 
the structures we find distinguish democratic 
from non-democratic elites, especially since 
non-democratic countries are not examined? 
Several characteristics of the elite structures can 
be mentioned here. 
The first is the pivotal position of demo-
cratically elected politicians in the elite central 
cirdes. Moreover, according to Dahrendorf 
(1967) the existence of elites that reftect the 
diversity of interests in society, is an important 
criterion for a successful democracy. Dur studies 
show that the elite cirdes in a11 three countries 
are indeed socia11y helerogeneous in terms of 
social dass and religious backgrounds and that 
they also indude the leaders of a great variely of 
organizational sectors and interest groups. 
Finally, the members of the elite cirdes were nol 
attitudina11y more homogeneous than the 
members of the much larger positional elite 
sampies. In West Germany, the only country for 
which we have data that allow us to compare 
elite and mass political issue attitudes, dissensus 
over issues was even more pronounced in the 
elite than in the general population. ll 
Dur emphasis on the existence and 
importance of indusive, largely informal 
networks paralleis some ideas that have also 
been discussed by scholars studying con-
sociational democracies (cf. Lijphart, 1969, 
1977, 1984; Nordlinger, 1972). In both 
instances, elites are accorded a central role in 
managing democratic institutions and mediating 
political confticts. Nevertheless, most analyses 
of consociational democracies pay relatively 
liule attention to the elite networks that underlie 
them, and they instead concentrate on the 
consociational patterns of governance in which 
political inputs and outputs are distributed 
proportionately among culturally distinct elites 
and the population segments they lead. Also, 
consociationalism foeuses more or less ex-
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clusively on the viability of democracy in 
subculturally segmented societies, while we are 
more generally interested in the patterns of elite 
interactions that distinguish democracies from 
other types of regimes. Following again Sartori's 
line of reasoning, we view democracies as 
located on a continuum on which majoritarian 
democracy and consociational democracy are to 
be considered as the polar types, depending on 
the degree of subcultural segmentation of a 
society. Real democracies are therefore charac-
terized by a specific blend of majoritarian and 
non-majoritarian decisions (1987: 240). This 
may even vary over time according to the 
development of the salience of sociopolitical 
cleavages in a society. 
Because incumbency in senior positions in 
powerful formal organizations is the most 
important determinant of elite locations in these 
data, the organizational basis of elite networks 
bulks large in our analysis. In this respect, our 
findings intersect with those of Laumann and 
Knoke (1987) on the organizational bases oi 
policy-making networks in the US, and it is 
instructive to compare and contrast their 
analysis with our own. Contending that it is the 
interactions among formal organizations, rather 
than 'natural persons', that are decisive for 
policy outcomes in the modern 'organizational 
state" Laumann and Knoke find 'Iarge, ex-
clusive, highly differentiated communities of 
policy-making organizations' in two policy 
domains, health and energy, during the late 
1970s and early 1980s (1987: 380).12 
The patterns that Laumann and Knoke re port 
parallel the thrust of our findings in that they do 
not readily accord with the conventional 
perspectives. The extent to which a relatively 
small number of large organizations monopolize 
policy-making, and the 'divorce' which they find 
between organizational interests and the 
preferences of mass publics do not fit the 
pluralist perspective. In their main body of data, 
on the other hand, Laumann and Knoke find 
little or no evidence of the centralized 
integration of organizational actors that the 
power elite and class perspectives lead one to 
expect: they do not identify any overarching 
structure analogous to our central circles, and 
the picture they paint is simply that of a densely 
interconnected, inclusive, and issue-based 
network of organizational actors. However, to 
the extent that contacts between organizations 
reftect formal institutional structures more than 
do contacts between persons, the absence of a 
centralized pattern of integration in their data 
may in part reftect the decision to focus on 
organizational actors rather than key 'natural 
persons' (Le. elites). Had they focused more 
directly on the numerous informal relations 
between the elite persons who make such 
institutions and organizations work, indications 
of a more centralized interaction sttucture might 
weil have emerged. 
In the the most recent analysis of their data, 
Heinz et al. analyzed the patterns of personal 
contacts among key representatives of private 
interest organizations. Instead of an identifiable 
set of core actors, they found a network in which 
the notables of their sampie were located around 
an empty center (1990: 381). This result is 
interpreted as indicating that the system is held 
together by surface tension rather than the 
'magnetism of a dense core' (1990: 382). 
However, while these results are incompatible 
with the assumption of an 'inner circle' of 
business elites managing the American economy 
(cf. Useem, 1984), it is not inconsistent with our 
claim of an inclusive elite circle made up of 
representatives from all major societal sectors. 
The authors themselves mention that 
government officials were not included in the 
analysis and that this omission may account for 
the absence of a network core. They further 
note that the central role of politicians probably 
varies across policy domains (1990: 383). Thus, 
while we do not deny that elite networks in some 
policy areas lack a decisionmaking center, we 
still claim that the overall structure is 
characterized by the existence of a central elite 
circle. 
Given our concern with the adequacy of the 
conventional perspectives in conceptualizing 
national elite integration in stable democracies, 
we have highlighted common features of 
American, Australian, and West German elite 
integration and the ways they cut across the two 
perspectives. But we are not c1aiming that these 
national elites are three peas in a pod, and it is 
necessary to comment briefty on some of the 
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patterns that distinguish them. First, it is elear 
that the network centrality of civil service elites 
varies according to the structure of national 
political institutions (see Table 2): very central 
in Australia's Westminster-derived parliamen-
tary system in which a civil servant is often the 
second most important official in a government 
department, after the minister himlherseJf; 
essentially peripheral in the US's presidential 
system with its thick layer of political appointees 
on the top of the civil service in all departments 
and agencies; and moderately central in West 
Germany's system in which policy-making 
activity in a ministry rests largely with the 
minister, one or two junior ministers, and 
several 'political' civil servants (Hoffmann-
Lange, 1985). 
Second, and similarly, the network centrality 
of political leaders belonging to major political 
parties appears to be inftuenced strongly by a 
country's form of government (see Table 4). The 
American presidential form of government, with 
its separation of powers among the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches, enables 
political leaders associated with one party to 
achieve centrality by virtue of their control of 
the White House and the executive branch, 
while leaders associated with the other party 
may enjoy equal centrality by virtue of their 
control of one or both houses of Congress. Thus 
we find that Republican political leaders, who 
controlled the executive branch at the time of 
our American research, were not more 
numerous in the central cirele, and only slightly 
more numerous in the cirele's core, than were 
their Democratic counterparts, who controlled 
Congress at the time. Under the parliamentary 
form of government in Australia and West 
Germany, by contrast, politicalleaders affiliated 
with the party or parties that controlled 
parliament, and thus also the executive branch 
(the Labor Party in Australia and the Social 
Democrats and Free Democrats in West 
Germany) at the time of our research, were 
either significantly more numerous in the central 
circle's core (Australia) or in both the central 
circle and its core (West Germany) than were 
leaders of the opposition party or parties. 
Following this line of reasoning, we can also 
speculate that federal systems of government 
result in a more balanced distribution of 
network centrality among the politicalleaders of 
all major parties because, regardless of which 
party or parties control the federal government, 
leaders of other parties will control important 
state governments and thus achieve considerable 
centrality in the national elite network. We 
would thus expect leaders of the party or parties 
controlling national governments in unitary 
political systems to more nearly monopolize the 
most central network positions. However, 
because all three of the countries we have 
examined are federal systems, we can only 
speculate that comparisons with unitary systems 
Iike those of Britain or Sweden would reveal this 
difference. 
It is important to highlight one other national 
feature that emerges from this research. This is 
the comprehensively integrated structure of the 
West German national elite. In so far as this 
kind of elite structure is a precondition of stable 
democracy, its existence in West Germany is 
important evidence that the country has by now 
joined the ranks of other, well-established 
Western democracies such as the US and 
Australia. Debate over the character and 
democratic proclivities of the West German elite 
has been a recurrent theme in discussions of the 
country's politics since its formation after the 
demise ofNazism (see, inter alia, Edinger, 1960; 
Zapf, 1965; Dahrendorf, 1967; Wildenmann, 
1975). While we do not elaim that our data are 
conc1usive on this question, our finding that 
West German national elite structure and 
functioning in the 1980s differs in no 
fundamental way from its American and 
Australian counterparts is one more indication 
of the stability of West German democracy. 
CONCLUSION 
Examination of the issue-oriented communi-
cation structures of national elites in three stable 
democracies shows that, despite wide variation 
in the sizes of the American, West German, and 
Australian populations, national elites in these 
countries each contain a central cirele consisting 
of a few hundred persons. The sizes, compo-
sitions, and densities of these central cireles, and 
even more of their cores, make for elose and 
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frequent interaction among individuals who 
typically hold the uppermost positions in the 
most important institutions and organizations of 
the societies. Although we do not claim that the 
central circles alone explain the stability of these 
three democracies, we contend that they are 
consistent with what recent thinking about elite 
integration in stable democracies leads one to 
expect, that they suggest the profit which is to be 
had in fusing the coventional perspectives, and 
that they iIIuminate how power-sharing occurs 
and is sustained in stable democracies. 
In conduding, it is important to recall that all 
theories of elites begin with the Hobbesian 
problem of order. Controversies of the 
Enlightenment period were, after all, less about 
societies in general than about the necessary and 
proper roles of governance and elites. In our 
time, the theory of a power elite or a ruling dass 
depicts order as stemrning from the coercive 
actions of a largely unchecked and un-
representative elite. Pluralist theory, on the 
other hand, 'solves' the problem of order by 
denying the power of elites to do very much on 
their own. In contrast, OUT approach describes 
the mechanisms which govem the govemors but 
which at the same time allow the governors 
considerable latitude of action. The mechanisms 
we describe are shifting, informal and mainly 
invisible central power circIes which afford the 
leaders of different organizations, institution al 
sectors and camps of opinion relatively easy, 
safe access to one another. These mechanisms 
can be thought of as the 'superstructure' which 
binds elites in stable democracies. In the 
absence of this superstructure, the problem of 
order at the level of govemance and elites may 
be solved, as Hobbes saw, in ways that are 
anathema to democracy. 
NOTES 
1. Thus scholars have traced the stable democratic regimes 
01 England, Sweden, Austria, Costa Riea, Venezuela, 
aod Spain, among athers. to sudden aod deliberate 'elite 
settlements' or 'elite pacts' in which previously warring 
elite factions guarantced each ather's vital intereSls aod 
created new interaction structures that enabled them to 
defend aod advance their often opposing interests in 
ways that were consonant with democratic institutions 
(Wilde. 1978; Hartlyn, 1984; Peeler. 1985; Karl. 1986; 
Q'Donncll aod Schmitter. 1986; Gunther. Sani aod 
Shabad, 1986; Burton ond Higley. 19870) while 
maintaining rivatries aod competitions which check the 
power 01 existing goyeroments (Schumpeter, 1941). 
2. Thc West German data are part of a (arger survey of 
1.744 persons which is comprised 01 both the 497 top 
elite position-holders included here and 1.247 occupants 
of second-tier elite positions. 
3. Tbe West German snowball sampie consists of persons 
in the sampie of second-tier elites who were nominated 
on sociometric questions by three or more top 
respondents. 
4. The great muckraker, Lincoln Steffens, was able to 
trace the illegal activities of political bosses in part 
because they believed that therr activities were 
legitimate attempts to live up to their obligations. 
Though we did not know this at the time. some of Dur 
American respondents' most vigorous activities were 
involved in minimizing the impact of the not yet 
revealed Watergate scandal. One such respondent 
reponed that he was most interested in environmental 
issues and gave os his network of contacts on maUers 
related to the environment. He did not report bis 
Watergate network. Was this information entirely false? 
No. because he later wrote a book about environmental 
issues and obviously cared a good deal about them. 
Those were his legitimate concems. 
S. In our view it is foUy to assume that in the hour or even 
two hOUTS that top policy-makers gave us we could 
correctly distinguish directionality of interaction. For 
example. key Congressional committee members 
regularly interact with business leaders. Who starts the 
interaction is hard 10 say. 
6. Note again that we do not rcify these centrality scores, 
in the sense that we do not analyze the scores in detail. 
Rather • we dichotomize the scores into the top 100 and 
a1l others. This procedure makes almost moot which 
measure of centrality we utilize. Moreover. it minimizes 
the problem of the 'name dropper'-the person wbo 
knows exactly which contacts are the 'right' names to 
give, thus placing bimself right in the center of the 
network. yet who bimself is not named by anyone 
important. Because we do not assume directionality, 
our analysis is vulnerable to this ploy. In experimental 
analyses in which we did assume directionality. we 
uncovered only a few "name droppers' within the top 7S 
who are in our sampie. Dropping them from the 
analyses did not substantively change the findings. 
7. The lesser prevalence of the political sectors in the 
Australian and West German circles. relative to the 
American circle. is due in part to differences in the 
sociometric questions among the tbree studies. In the 
Australian and West German surveys all respondents 
were asked to name contacts in several private seaoTS, 
wbile tbe American study asked these questions only of 
snowba1l sampie respondents. As a result. fewer persons 
in non-political sectors were nominated in the American 
study. Nevertheless, reanalysis of the Australian and 
American network data. using only nominations from 
live identical sociometric questions. produced 
comparable results: the political.governmental 5ectors 
maintain their prominente in both networb while 
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remaining more numerous in the American network 
(Higley .nd Moore, 1981: 591-93). 
8. This German pattern is due' mainly to the very high 
degree of organizational centralization among West 
German trade unions. which makes it difficult to draw a 
wide sampie of trade union leaders whose positions 3re 
more or less equivalent in imponance. 
9. Father's sociaI dass is measured by a modification of 
Wright aod Perrone's neo-Marxist classification (1977) 
which has four categories: 1. capitalist: OWDef of a 
business with at least tcn employees; 2. petty bourgeois: 
owner of a business witb zero 10 nine employees; 3. 
manager: supervises work of others but not self-
employed; 4. worker: not self-employed and does not 
supervise the work of others (Moore and Alba. 1982: 
44). 
10. Parsons' analysis of attitudes towards the Family 
Assistance Plan. a welfare reform proposal before 
Congress at the time of the American survey, reveals 
that central drele memben were considerably more 
willing to compromise. to support the bill even if they 
personally disapproved of some aspeets of it. than were 
persons outside the eentral cirele. 
11. Our results are also corroborated by Pappi's loeal elite 
study in which even a small and exclusive local 'power 
elite' derived from reputational nominations was not 
characterized by attitudinal homogeneity (Pappi and 
Kappelhoff, 1984: !OS). 
12. Laumann and KRoke portray a policy-making precess in 
whieh: targe-seale organizations are the only effeetive 
participants in poliey decisions; the boundaries between 
public and private seetors are blurred, even irrelevant, 
in the Slructure of decisionmaking~ government 
organizations frequently promote their own agendas; 
policy preferences are shaped primarily by non-
ideological organizational imperatives as interpreted by 
autonomous organizational managers; major slructural 
changes are seldom on the agenda; and poliey outcomes 
mainly reftect idiosyncratie organizational interests and 
shifting interorganizational coalirions rather than the 
preferences of mass publics (1987: 380-7). 
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APPENDIXA 
Sectors and key organizations in the American, West German and Australian elite studies 
Sector 
Politics 
Civil Service 
Business 
Unions 
Media 
Academic<a> 
Voluntary 
Associations 
Other 
United States 
Cabinet. politicaJ appointments. 
Congress, White House staff, 
key govemors and mayors, 
parties 
Federal departments aod 
independent agencies 
Fortune 800, centirniUionaires, 
business assocjations 
Largest unions and 
federations 
Largest newspapers, magazines, 
TV and radjo, press agencies 
Universities, research 
institutes 
Professional. public affain. 
ethnic. wornen's groups 
None 
Organizations 
West Germany 
FederaJ and state cabinet, 
Bundestag, panies 
Federal ministries, state 
ministries, statutory 
agencies 
Largest industrial aod 
non·industrial corporations. 
business associations 
Largest unions and 
federations 
Largest newspapers. magazines, 
preSS agendes. TV. radio 
Universities. research 
institutes 
Churches, professional 
associations. consumers' 
associations 
Judicial. military 
Australia 
Cabinet, shadow cabinet, 
parties 
Federal departments, 
statutory agendes 
Largest industrial, 
non·industrial 
corporations 
Largest unions and 
federations 
Largest newspapers. 
magazines. TV, radio 
Universities, research 
institutes 
Professional. public affairs, 
women's groups 
None 
Note: (a) The academic sector in the American sampIe includes only persons in the snowbaU sampie, Le. those named by 
several others On the sociometric questions. 
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